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The hazard rate models used in the recent bankruptcy literature assume the censor-
ing and the default are two independent events, which means the censored company
will eventually default. However we believe there will be a portion in the censored
group that will be long-term survivors and we propose a mixture model of survivors
and risky companies. Moreover this dissertation models the event and the timing
of default incident at the same time. For the event of default and the timing of de-
fault we utilize a logistic regression. The results have justified the advantage of our
model over the standard hazard rate models and proved its predictive power. The
companies identified as high default risk by our model proved to deliver extremely
low returns in the market.
iv
Declaration
No portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support




I would like to thank my supervisors, Thom Thurston and Yildiray Yildirim for their
advice, ideas and guidance throughout the last three years. In particular, to Yildiray
for introducing me to this topic, helping me with suggestions and motivation and
for his patience and encouragement with technical aspects of my work and Thom
for simplifying the challenges I face, trusting my intuitions and for his inspiration.
I thank my parents and my brothers for their continual encouragement and
for their faith in me. And I acknowledge all of my close friends for being there when
I needed them.
Finally, I give thanks to the Provost Office for their generous funding as
Provost‘ Fellowship, Graduate Teaching Fellowship, Sue Rosenberg Zalk Student
Travel and Research Fund and Doctoral Student Research Grant.
vi
Dedication











1.0.1 Definition of Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.0.2 Definition of Censoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.0.3 Probability of Default (PD) Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Literature Review 9
2.1 Static Modeling of PD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
viii
2.2 Dynamic Modeling of PD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 A Mixture Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Valuation Methodology 15
3.1 A new Statistical Model: Mixture Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1.1 Comparison of Traditional Methods and Our New Approach . 15
3.1.2 Valuation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 An Improved Hazard Rate Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.1 Valuation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4 Data and Covariates 24
4.1 Dataset Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2 Firm Specific Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2.1 Accounting Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2.2 Distance to Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2.3 Market Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3 Industry Specific Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.4 Market Specific Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5 Results 34
5.1 In-Sample Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.2 Out-of-Sample Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45







1.1 The Largest Ten Bankruptcies in the US History . . . . . . . 3
4.1 Distribution of Companies within Industries . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2 Distribution of Companies within Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3 Industry Classification of SIC Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4 Fixed Effects: Four Industry Groups Defined as Fixed Effects 32
4.5 Descriptive Statistics for Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.1 Expected Signs for The Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.2 Mixture Models vs Hazard Rate Models . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.3 Odds Ratios for Model 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.4 Distribution of Bankruptcies for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 . 43
5.5 Mixture Model on Non-Financial and Financial Companies 44
5.6 Distance to Default Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.7 Mixture Model on Lagged Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
xi
List of Figures
1.1 Bankruptcies by Year
The figure shows the number of bankrupt companies within each year
for the period 1980-2007. The percentage of bankruptcies are defined
as of the total number of companies each year. The highest level and
percentage is observed in 2001. The figure depicts the values in Table
4.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1 The Graphical Representation of Mixture Model
The variables Y , c, p(x) and h1t(t; z) are defined in the text. . . . . . 17
4.1 Bankruptcies by Industry Group
The figure depicts the values in Table 4.1. It shows the number
of healthy and bankrupt companies within each industry group for
the period 1980-2007. The percentage of bankruptcies are defined
as of each industry. The highest percentage is observed in the third
industry group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1 Estimated Hazard Rates
Hazard rates are estimated by Mixture Model-1 in Table 5.2. . . . . . 39
5.2 Actual vs. Predicted Default Rates
The figure shows the actual vs. estimated default rates for the period
1980-2007. The default is defined as the Chapter 7 or 11 filing of the
company. The predicted rates are calculated using the fitted values
of models Model 1 and HR1 in Table 5.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
xii
5.3 Power Curves
Average out-of-sample power curves for one-year, two-year default
predictions, after 2003 and after 1998. In the one year power curve,
for each fraction x on the horizontal axis, the curve shows the fraction
of the firms that defaulted within one year. In two-year curve, the
curve shows the fraction of the firms that defaulted within two years.
The fractions on the x-axis are the portfolios. The portfolios in Model
1 curve formed according to estimated default probabilities at the
year 2003 in Panel A by Model 1 in Table 5.2 and the portfolios
in HR1 curve formed according to estimated default probabilities by
HR1 of the same table. 10 portfolios cover the entire company space
of 2003 in Panel A and 1998 in Panel B. There are equal number of
firms in each portfolio. Portfolio-1 refers to the riskiest 10% in both
estimations. Riskiest 10% predicts all of upcoming defaults in three
years in Model 1. Model 1 is similar to HR1 in one year prediction
and more accurate compared to HR1 in two-year predictions. . . . . . 50
5.4 Sample Companies
The graphs plot the annualized default probabilities estimated by
Model-1. On the vertical axis, the estimated default probabilities are
given in percentages. On the horizontal axis, the years are given. For
Lehman Brothers, the data starts from 1994, while for Washington
Mutual it starts from 1986. Both of these companies exist in the the
riskiest first portfolio, constructed in 2003. They filed for the largest
bankruptcies of the US history in 2008, the upcoming year for the
dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.5 Two-year Forecast by Model 1
The graph displays the two-year forecast of the annual default proba-
bility by Model 1. The forecasted part of the Model 1 is presented by
the dashed portion. The real default percentages are also displayed.
We have the bankruptcy data up until 2008, however it was not em-
ployed in the estimation due to the lack of accounting data. The
dashed part in the real data refers to the part that is not utilized in
the estimation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
xiii
5.6 Average Excess Returns in 2003, 2004 and 2005
The graphs plot the average excess return in 2003, 2004 and 2005 for
each portfolio formed in 2003. On the horizontal axis, the first one
being the riskiest, portfolios from one to ten present lower default
risk. The portfolios are not equal size. From the first one to the last
one, they contain the 5%, 5%, 10%, 10%, 20%, 20%, 10%, 10%, 5%,
and 5% of the companies respectively. Excess return is the real return




1.0.1 Definition of Default
Default is the failure to meet legal obligations of a debt contract.Whenever a home-
owner fails to make his/her payments on a mortgage, whenever a firm fails to pay
its loan, they are in default. For a creditor, the prediction and prevention of default
is critical. In this dissertation we examine the default event from the creditor’s side
and by focusing on the institutional borrowers try to answer the question of how
likely. We examine all of the publicly traded companies in the US. We follow a
more conservative approach to define default event. Bankruptcy, being Chapter 7
or 11 filing 1, has been set as the default event since a company or its creditors filing
with a federal bankruptcy court for protection under either Chapter 7 or Chapter
11 shows officially the company is unable to service its debt or pay its creditors. 2
Moody’s3 utilize a broader classification for default. (Hillegeist et al. (2004)) It is
defined to include three types of event:
• A missed or delayed disbursement of interest and/or principal, including de-
layed payments made within a grace period;
• Bankruptcy, administration, legal receivership, or other legal blocks (perhaps
by regulators) to the timely payment of interest and/or principal; or
1Refer Swanson (2008) for details
2Chava and Jarrow (2004) have also used this approach.
3www.moodys.com
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• A distressed exchange occurs where:
– the issuer offers debt holders a new security or package or securities that
amount to a dismissed financial obligation (such as preferred of common
stock, or debt with a lower coupon or par amount, lower seniority, or
longer maturity); or
– the exchange had the apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid
default.
In some studies the default event might even include financially driven de-listings,
or D ratings issued by leading credit rating agencies. (Campbell et al. (2008))
Company defaults have always been at the center of attention due to its social
effects beyond the economic ones. Especially during economic recessions the issue
gains higher importance. Figure 1.1 presents the level and percentage of bankrupt-
cies for the US market between 1980 and 2007. The upward moves points to the
recession periods while downward moves are the signs of recovery. Historically as
the economy expands and the number of companies grow, the bankruptcy event be-
comes more frequent. It might be considered as a rare event before 1980s. However
during recent decades besides he number the size of bankruptcies turn out to be
significant. Table 1.1 presents the largest ten bankruptcies of the US history.
1.0.2 Definition of Censoring
Censoring occurs when the value of an observation is only partially known. If a data
point is below a certain point by an unknown value, it is called left − censoring . If a
data point is above a certain point by an unknown value, it is called right − censoring .
It is possible to associate censoring with the missing data problem. The value is
partially known, because the data is missing.
In our context, censoring means the partial observation of default event for
any company. If the company has already defaulted, the observation is complete.
However if it has not defaulted, it is not possible to guarantee its survival in the
future. Anything might happen, it may survive or default. Therefore any dataset
would be considered as censored at the cut-off point and censoring makes default
2
Figure 1.1: Bankruptcies by Year
The figure shows the number of bankrupt companies within each year for the period
1980-2007. The percentage of bankruptcies are defined as of the total number of
companies each year. The highest level and percentage is observed in 2001. The
figure depicts the values in Table 4.2.
Table 1.1: The Largest Ten Bankruptcies in the US History
Company Bankruptcy Date Total Assets (bn)
1 Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. 9/15/2008 $639
2 Washington Mutual 9/26/2008 $307
3 Worldcom, Inc. 7/21/2002 $103.91
4 Enron Corp. 12/2/2001 $63.39
5 Conseco, Inc. 12/18/2002 $61.39
6 Texaco, Inc. 4/12/1987 $35.89
7 Financial Corp. of America 9/9/1988 $33.86
8 Refco Inc. 10/17/2005 $33.33
9 Global Crossing Ltd. 1/28/2002 $30.18
10 Pacific Gas and Electric Co. 4/6/2001 $29.77
11 UAL Corp. 12/9/2002 $25.20
12 Delta Air Lines, Inc. 9/14/2005 $21.80
This table lists the largest ten bankruptcies of the US history. As can be seen the list contains 1987 bankruptcy
earliest. Total assets are the pre-bankruptcy values in billions of dollars. We do not have the data for 2008 in our
sample period, therefore the top ten bankruptcy list for our sample would include UAL Corp. and Delta Air Lines.
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event vague. Since default event, if it is going to happen, might happen ”after” a
specific cut-off date, the type is right-censoring.
Another problem with the default data regarding censoring is the proportion
of censored observations to uncensored observations. The distinction of light and
heavy-censoring has to be done. Light − censoring is the case where the number of
censored observations are minority, while heavy − censoring is the case where the
number of censored observations are majority. In default data we observe heavy-
censoring, as we define all surviving companies as censored at the cut-off date.
Figure 1.1 shows the percentage of bankrupt companies within total by year for 27
years and historically speaking, bankruptcy event has always been a rare event.
1.0.3 Probability of Default (PD) Estimation
Probability of default (PD) is the degree of likelihood that the borrower of a loan
or debt will get into default. The use and estimation of PD has gained higher
importance after the Basel II accord. The Base Committee on Banking Supervision
has required banks to maintain regulatory capital for three major risks faced by a
bank: credit risk, operational risk and market risk. According to the accord, among
these risks, credit risk can be calculated either through standardized approach or
one of internal rating-based approaches. Under internal rating-based approaches,
the banks develop their own empirical model to estimate probability of default, loss
given default and exposure at default for individual or group of clients which in turn
will be used to calculate the required capital for the bank.
Basically there are two methods for PD estimation. First one is structural
models, using a historical database of actual defaults and the second one is reduced
form models which derives default probability from the observable prices of credit
default swaps, bonds or options on common stocks.
In this dissertation, we propose an improved statistical model, namely a mix-
ture model, for the default 4 probability which measures the event and timing of the
4As mentioned earlier, bankruptcy, being Chapter 7 or 11 filing, has been set as the default
event. Later in the paper, bankruptcy and default terms will be used interchangeably. However,
by setting the dependent variable as bankruptcy, we are indeed measuring the bankruptcy event.
Chava and Jarrow (2004) have also used this approach.
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default at the same time and changes the assumption about the censored observa-
tions to include the long-term survivors. Besides, we improve the predictor variables
to include the government stimulus and macro-economic changes captured by the
unemployment rate.
The majority of the discussion regarding default rates evolves around the pi-
oneering works of Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), Zmijewski (1984) and more
recently Shumway (2001). The models proposed by Altman, Ohlson or Zmijew-
ski constitute the static approach 5 to default estimation. Shumway, on the other
hand, introducing time variation to the covariates initiated a dynamic interpretation
of corporate default events. Authors following Shumway, re-proved the superiority
of dynamic modeling over static modeling. Shumway’s hazard rate modeling has
been improved by Chava and Jarrow (2004) to include industry dummies and by
Das et al. (2007) to include industry frailties. Duffie et al. (2007) instead of
Shumway’s accounting variables, utilized Merton’s distance to default measure as
Vassalou and Xing (2004), Da and Gao (2008) and Campbell et al. (2008) did.
Besides, Campbell et al. used market values of Shumway’s accounting variables.
Bharath and Shumway (2008), on the other hand, found that Merton DD model
does not provide a sufficient statistic for default probability. Roszbach (2004),
instead, used a bivariate tobit model with a variable censoring threshold to evalu-
ate the survival of loans. The efforts to find out more efficient indicators, instead
of seldom updated accounting variables, or capture contagion effects (Das et al.
(2007)) through industry indicators or frailties were not sufficient to correct for the
fundamental deficiency embedded in hazard rate modeling due to heavy censoring6
(i.e. majority of the companies in the sample do not observe bankrutcy event). Our
proposed model overcomes this problem.
All of the prior works of dynamic modeling, either multi-period logistic, weibull,
cox proportional hazard or tobit regressions are indeed modeling the timing of de-
fault by defining the intensity of default at each point in time. However, in our
mixture model, we model event and intensity at the same time. What are the pre-
5”Static model” is a terminology first used by Shumway (2001) to refer to single-period clas-
sification models for multi-period bankruptcy data.
6Heavy censoring means the number of censored observation are higher than uncensored ob-
servations. Considering the fact that average default rates observed in real life fluctuates around
5 − 10%, and since we know the survivors are always partially observed/ censored, default data
always has the problem of heavy censoring.
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dictor for whether the company will default and when it will default? We answer
both questions at the same time, which in turn significantly improves the in-sample
prediction power of our model compared to the rest of the models. The results show
that mixture model correctly identifies the companies to default in the sample, while
hazard rate models fail to do so. The second distinction of the mixture model is
the treatment of censored observations. Hazard rate models define a hazard rate
for failing observations and a survival rate for the censored ones. Censored obser-
vations have the same fate, censoring and default are independent from each other.
Therefore all of the censored observations defined to have survived for the sample
period, and consequently are assumed to fail altogether in the future. However in
the mixture model, we define two cases for censored observations. The censored
observations are the combination of long-term survivors and risky companies. We
believe it is not effective to consider a healthy survivor in the same group with
Lehman Brothers who will fail the next year after the end of the observation period.
7
In the sample data selection, works prior to ours naturally have operated with
an earlier starting point and on a smaller sample. In the subsequent works the
significant distinction is observed at the year 1979. It is preferred to use the data
after 1979 in order to avoid a possible shift in the coefficients on account of the
new bankruptcy law of 1978. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which became
effective on October 1, 1979 completely replaced the former act. 1978 Act estab-
lished US Bankruptcy courts in each federal judicial district, added new chapters
for business reorganization and personal bankruptcy. Chapter 11 and Chapter 13
are added with this act replacing some old chapters. In general, 1978 Act made it
easier for both businesses and individuals to file a bankruptcy and to reorganize.
Another common application is to truncate the data at the 1st -99th or 5th -95th
percentiles to prevent outlier effects on the results. In this study both of these pre-
cautions have been taken. We have 2,011,977 month-per-company observations for
the period 1980-2007. We have identified 1,640 bankruptcies out of 18,505 publicly
traded companies after correcting for the missing and repeating observations. We
have not considered the private companies due to the lack of information supplied
to the market compared to publicly listed counterparts.
7Our sample cover 1980-2007, Lehman Brother enters into our sample period as a healthy
company.
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Besides the econometric modeling, we also focus on the fundamentals behind
the bankruptcies. Bankruptcies are the ‘invisible hand’ of financial system to clean
out the bad apples from the good ones. The companies that made bad investment
decisions and turn out to be insolvent are punished by liquidation. Productivity is
the key factor for competitiveness and economic growth; that is why, as Prescott
argues, the US is richer than the whole world (Parente and Prescott (2002)). Un-
productive firms need to die for the economy to live happily ever after. The same
fear of depressing the efficiency of production is behind major critiques of the 2009
bail-out plans. Thus productivity, profitability and efficiency are the central predic-
tors in our model. Although the main job of bankruptcies in competitive markets is
to augment productivity in the end, the productivity and efficiency measures used
by Altman (1968) in his Z-score calculation have been ignored by the recent stud-
ies, we re-emphasize their importance. Productivity and efficiency measuring the
contribution of the business to the real economy, we have used profitability to figure
out the contribution of the company to its owners. With respect to the debt man-
agement we have leverage ratio to capture the size of firm’s debt burden, solvency
ratio to evaluate whether it will be able to pay its debt back and liquidity ratio to
deduce the proximity of the payments through available liquid assets. These are the
accounting ratios deemed to be critical in default probability estimation together
with Shumway’s (2001) market variables; relative size, sigma and excess return.
In addition to the productivity of the business as a means for natural selection
of later generations, we have been interested in two major macroeconomic factors:
the unemployment rate and the stimulus packages. A rising unemployment rate
as a proxy for unfavorable economic conditions, and bankruptcies leading mass
layoffs during crisis suggest positive relationship between default probability and
the unemployment rate.
Another central issue in our study is the impact of the stimulus packages,
measured by the annual government spending on the bankruptcy filings. From banks
to financial institutions, auto industry giants to insurance companies; participants
have been waiting for the government to save them from bankruptcy during the
recent crisis. The question of whether these stimulus plans will help to rescue the
economy from the greatest downturn after Great Depression. We propose to seek the
answer in the historical evidence. And we have found government spending being
7
one of the most influential variable in our model, contrary to the existing fears in
the market, history shows governments have been managed to reduce defaults by
stimulating the economy.
Exploiting all of these crucial predictors both on the business and market level,
and implementing a mixture model we have been able to identify the default rate
as 7.34%, which is very close to 8.14%.
The next step after the estimation of defaults, we discuss the return on compa-
nies. Campbell et al. (2008) show the high default risk companies deliver extremely
low returns, on the other hand, Gao (2008) conclude high-default risk companies
provide abnormally high returns, however not as a result of the default risk. Our
findings are consistent with Campbell et al. (2008).
Lastly, after picking up the bad apples from the barrel, we have turned to
the question: ‘What should investors do now?’ Vassalou and Xing (2004), detect
abnormal returns associated with distressed stocks. Da and Gao (2008), on the
other hand, approving high returns, claimed those high returns, indeed, were not a
result of increasing default risk. We, however, found distressed companies receive
extremely low returns. 8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant
literature. Section 3 develops the model setting. Section 4 reviews the data used
to test our model. Section 5 presents the results of our investigation. Section 6
concludes the paper.




2.1 Static Modeling of PD
First, we will explore the static modeling for default. ”Static model” is a terminology
first used by Shumway (2001) to refer to single-period classification models for multi-
period bankruptcy data. Altman (2000) for the calculation of his popular Z-score
uses a sample of 66 more or the less proportionate manufacturing firms, 33 of which
have failed. The sample data lies over the period 1946 to 1965. On this dataset,
using multiple discriminant analysis, 5 of the initial 22 variables, WC/TA, RE/TA,
EBIT/TA, MVE/TL and S/TA were selected as more predictive.1 Z-score provides
information about the distress of the company. Specifically, the greater the firm′s
distress the lower the discriminant score. Altman (2000) finds that Z-score is an
accurate forecaster of failure as far as 2 years in advance. Next he estimated ZETA
score; he counts 53 bankrupt and 58 healthy firms. Compared to Z, ZETA has more
variables in, a higher accuracy as a score, and the ability to forecast up to 5 years
prior to the failure.
1For the definition of these variables, please see section: Data-Firm Specific Accounting Vari-
ables
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2.2 Dynamic Modeling of PD
Shumway (2001) criticizing the static models to his time, proposes a dynamic
approach, which in time turned out to be the most popular way of bankruptcy
modeling, known as the hazard rate model. He retains 300 bankruptcies in 3,182
non-financial companies for the period 1962-1992. He truncates the accounting data
at the 1 and 99 percentiles and defines the default event as filing for any type of
bankruptcy. The dependent variable in the model is the time spent by a firm in the
healthy group. In other words, for each year the dependent variable shall indicate
whether the firm is filed for bankruptcy or not. On the right hand side, the indepen-
dent variables include firm age, firm size, excess return and standard deviation of
stock returns, besides the Altman (1968)’s Z score variables and Zmijewski (1984)’s
variables of NI/TA, TL/TA and CA/CL. His multi-period logit model (or hazard
model with logistic intensity of default) is consistent and efficient compared to in-
consistent static 2 models, because it corrects for period at risk and allows for time
varying covariates. After him, the hazard rate models became the standard, and
the studies to follow here apply hazard rate models mostly with logistic regression,
as Shumway (2001) does, or one of the exponential, Weibull or Cox regressions for
the default timing. He finds that half of the accounting ratios tested before are poor
predictors, and the market variables: size, return and standard deviation forecast
failure effectively.
Chava and Jarrow (2004) compare Altman (1968), Zmijewski (1984) and
Shumway (2001) in their respective predictive powers for bankruptcy. While the
previous literature uses the broader definition of default, they have employed the
simpler definition of Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 filing of the company. The total
of 1,197 bankruptcies out of 17,460 companies were extracted for the period 1962-
1999, 7 years more than that of Shumway (2001). The forecasting accuracy of the
models estimated with 1962-90 data over the years 1991-99 showed the superiority of
Shumway (2001)’s model to the other two. A private firm model was implemented
excluding market variables from the hazard rate estimation, and compared to the
public firm model with all the variables; it is their claim that the accounting variables
add little predictive power when market variables are in the model. By them,
2the single-period models
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Shumway (2001)’s model was extended to contain industry effect dummies using
four digit SIC codes, financial companies and monthly data; and all of them were
found to be accurate and significant in bankruptcy prediction.
Hillegeist et al. (2004) compare the two accounting based measures, Altman
(1968)’s Z score and Ohlson (1980)’s O score, to the market based measure of
Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM). The default event was defined as the initial filing of
bankruptcy, and 756 bankrupt firms out of 14,303 companies listed after the 1978
bankruptcy law for the years 1980 to 2000 were extracted. Consistent with the
literature, financial service firms were excluded to leave the total sample to 10,845
firms. Fama-French approach was administered for the industry classification. BSM-
probability defined by Hillegeist et al. (2004) is indeed the Merton distance to
default measure used in the upcoming studies. They run a single model for each
score variable, and for BSM-score on the following year’s bankruptcies and find
out BSM-score has the highest R2 among them. They apply discrete hazard rate
specification in the models. The results disclose BSM-probability is more powerful
than the score variables, that means Merton outperforms the Altman (1968) and
Ohlson (1980) models. After Hillegeist et al. Bharath and Shumway (2008) showed
the prediction performance of distance to default is relatively robust to its estimation
method, and they concluded distance to default is not sufficient as a default statistic
but as a variable, useful as an explanatory variable to forecast default.
Campbell et al. (2008) explore the corporate bankruptcy using a hazard
rate model similar to the Shumway (2001)’s model expanding the covariates. 796
bankruptcy events were identified for the years 1963 to 1998. Their model outper-
forms Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980), and possess greater power than Shumway
(2001)’s model since it includes additional variation such as new accounting and
macro variables. After constructing 10 consecutive portfolios from low to high prob-
ability of bankruptcy, they estimated the excess return, three and four factor Fama
French model, and detected high risk of bankruptcy delivers low average returns.
Saretto (2004) in his paper applies a time-varying duration model as well, to
analyze the probability of default. He acquires the non financial firms with total
assets more than $ 1 million for the years, after the introduction of new bankruptcy
law, 1979 to 2000. He had 7,282 healthy and 319 bankrupt firms in his estimation,
compared to 756 bankrupt firms out of 14,303 companies used by Hillegeist et al.
11
(2004)for the very same period. The default event, in his study, is the bond related
default and any of the missing payments, covenant violations, restructuring or in-
solvency is considered default. Besides Altman (1968)’s Z-score, Ohlson (1980)’s
O-score, Zmijewski (1984)’s and Shumway (2001)’s variables, coverage ratio and
Tobin’s Q are featured as independent variables. Furthermore, an error classifica-
tion measure (ECM) was developed to show how costly incorrect specification is.
Estimating Altman (1968)’s model using discriminant analysis, Ohlson (1980)’s,
Zmijewski (1984)’s and Shumway (2001)’s model using a logit analysis, he demon-
strates that duration model is more accurate with lowest ECM and outperforms the
rest. Additionally, examining the relationship between default probability and Fama
French distress factors, he displayed HML is indeed a distress factor in defaults.
Couderc and Renault (2005) estimated a duration model with not logistic but
exponential intensities for the 1981-2003 period across credit risk classes defined by
S&P. Their analysis illustrated financial market variables have weak explanatory
power while business cycle and credit market variables are key. In order to cover
past shocks, lagged estimation for each covariate up to two years are employed, and
to capture the default clustering within each industry, autoregressive conditional
duration model is run.
Chava et al. (2006) addressing the unobservable heterogeneity in the true state
of the firm, introduce a latent random variable at the industry level into the model
of default probability. 8 different models are derived by adding and subtracting
various variables to Shumway (2001)’s, Chava and Jarrow (2004)’s and Duffie’s
specifications. It is confirmed that the models for default probability and recovery
rate, though inversely related, depend on firm specific and macro economic variables,
and the random effects improve the in, but not out of the sample performance.
Roszbach (2004) models the decision to extend a loan and the survival time
of loan using a bivariate tobit model using data on over 13,000 loan applications
processed by a large Swedish bank in the mid-1990s. In his model the loans that are
declined are non-observable, and the survival time is right censored only for ”the
good loans” at the end of sampling period. In other words, all of the loans censored,
not defaulted within the sample period are assumed to be good loans, that will
never default. Within the observable group of loans, censoring became the indicator
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of non-failure. This specification is just the opposite of hazard rate assumption,
censoring and failure are two independent events.
2.3 A Mixture Model
In this dissertation, a mixture model is employed, and logistic regression is set for
the timing of default event, instead of the hazard rate model. The reason behind
this alteration is a fundamental drawback in hazard rate modeling. Primarily it is
developed for medical and biological sciences to address censored data. Consider a
study on the effectiveness of a new treatment for cancer, measured as the survival
days. At the end of the study, some patients will die, some will survive the entire pe-
riod. However, after the study the contact might be lost with some of the survivors.
It is not preferred to ignore these censored observations since they essentially denote
the success of the treatment. Survival models were developed to model the survival
time in these kinds of experiments as standard statistical techniques cannot usually
be applied because the underlying distribution is rarely normal and the data are
often ‘censored’. In order to overcome the censoring problem the way it is defined
in biostatistics, censoring is assumed to be independent from the failure event. This
is based on the assumption that all of the subjects will die in the long-run. It may
be reasonable considering the vast application of the survival models on cancer pa-
tients, however in a financial framework, it means a total calamity, all companies
filing for bankruptcy in the future. Even in the days of financial crisis right now,
we do not believe it is a fair assumption. The financial history shows that there
will always be a fraction of companies surviving, and mixture model captures the
surviving fraction. Compared to the hazard rate model which assume all censored
observations to fail and tobit model which assumes all censored observations will
survive, our model proposes a mixture of failures and survivals. Further it corrects
the problems aroused by heavy censoring. To expose its superiority, a standard
hazard rate shall be run in comparison, using the independent variables shared in
the literature.
The only application of mixture model in the financial distress framework is
done by Yildirim (2008) in his study of commercial real estate loans. Adopting a
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logistic regression for the intensity, he proposed a three-level mixture model for the
1,194 defaulted loans in the mortgage market for a 5-year period after 2000, the
levels to be loan, property type, and region. The very mixture model below is single




3.1 A new Statistical Model: Mixture Model
In the analysis of default probability, we are faced with a binary choice model where
the dependent variable takes values 0 and 1. First issue to consider is that the
company either defaults or survives in the period in which the data is taken, and
second the default event occurs at a particular point in time. We believe that a set
of factors gathered in the vector x explain the event of default, and another set
of factors gathered in the vector zt explain the timing of default. Note that the
factors in x do not depend on time while the factors in zt depend on time.
Then let’s first define a binary random variable Y for the default event where
Y = 0 states that the company is a long-term survisor, while Y = 1 states that
the company shall eventually default, and the probability of default is given by
p(x) = P (Y = 1;x).
3.1.1 Comparison of Traditional Methods and Our New Ap-
proach
The traditional approach is to define a logit regression for the analysis. However as
we have pointed out in the previous section more recently with the pioneering work of
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Shumway (2001), existing literature concentrated on discrete time hazard (survival)
models (Hillegeist et al. (2004), Campbell et al. (2008), Chava and Jarrow
(2004)). Shumway (2001) pointed two deficiencies in the single-period models:
Sample selection bias due to using only one, non-randomly selected observation per
company and failure to benefit from time-varying variables to model bankruptcy.
While in effort to correct these limitations, his proposition to use hazard rate/
survival model creates new short-comings.
The underlying assumption in survival models, without the correction for cure
probability, is the assumption of eventual default. Classical survival models of can-
cer research propose that all the subjects in the experiment shall die eventually, and
survival rate measures the days of survival before death. In a corporate bankruptcy
framework, this proposition would be translated as the eventual bankruptcy of all
companies which is not a practical assumption. Besides, it provides only an expla-
nation on the timing of default not the event of the default.
Another problem with the survival/hazard rate models stem from the heavy
censoring in the financial data. Even without considering the effect of duration,
the default is a rare event; the percentage of defaulted companies within a year, or
the percentage of defaulted companies over a period of time is always small. When
monthly data are used, the bankruptcy percentage becomes trivial. As pointed out
by Campbell et al. (2008) the percentage of bankruptcy months becomes literally
tiny compared to the other months.
In order to correct for these drawbacks, following Yildirim (2008), we shall
take advantage of another model popular in the biostatistics known as mixture cure
models or long-term survival models. The basic idea in this model is to correct for
eventual death of all subjects. The model assumes two groups of subjects, one of
which shall never experience the default event (i.e. long-term survisors), while the
other group shall eventually default. Moreover we shall be able to model the event
and the timing of the default at the same time and correct for heavy censoring.
Similar to hazard rate models we shall define the survival rate and hazard rate
for our mixture cure model. Beforehand we need to clarify the state of long-term
survivors. A fraction of the companies in the data are long term survivors, and they
shall never default. The rest shall eventually default. Therefore if the companies
16
in our study do not default there are two possibilities: Either they are long-term
survivors, or they shall default in the future but censored in the data. Note that Y
is partially observed for right censored cases. Then define a censoring indicator c,
where c = 1 stands for not censored, c = 0 stands for right censored cases and, as a
result we shall have 3 states of the art.
3.1.2 Valuation Framework
We have defined a binary choice variable for the event of default, Y = 1 if company
default and 0 otherwise, and a censoring indicator c = 1 if data is not censored and
0 otherwise. We will have three states based on Y and c as follows:
c = 1 & Y = 1 not censored,company defaults
c = 0 & Y = 1 censored,company will default eventually
c = 0 & Y = 0 censored,long-term survivor
Graphical representation of model is given in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: The Graphical Representation of Mixture Model
The variables Y , c, p(x) and h1t(t; z) are defined in the text.
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Probability of Default
The probability of default is p:
p = P (Y = 1;x), (3.1)
1− p = P (Y = 0;x), (3.2)
Conditional Probability Density
Let τ be a random default time. It is defined only when Y = 1 and conditional
probability density of it is:
f1(t) : f(t; z|Y = 1) = lim
∆t→0
P (t ≤ τ < t+ ∆t|Y = 1)
∆t
Note that the company failure time τ is a discrete non-negative random vari-
able, which refers to the month of default in our database and the subscript 1 stands
for the condition of default.
Conditional Survivor Function
Conditional survivor function describes the probability of the company to survive
till its default at τ :
S1(t) : S(t; z|Y = 1) = P (t < τ |Y = 1)
Conditional hazard rate describes the probability of the company to default
during the next time interval, given that it did not default before:
h1(t) : h(t; z) = P (t = τ |τ ≥ t, Y = 1) = lim
∆t→0










Conditional survivor function can be presented in terms of conditional proba-
bility density and conditional hazard rate in the following way:








Then inserting S1(t) into the equation 3.4, we would get;
f1(t) = h1(t)S1(t) (3.7)
Unconditional Survivor Function
However in our case, the unconditional survivor function, St, has to include the
long-term survivors:
St = S(t;x; z) = (1− p) + pS1(t) (3.8)
Therefore in our database, either the companies default, or they follow the
above survivor function. For those experiencing the default, the unconditional prob-
ability density is given by
P (c = 1;x; z) = pf1(t)
and for those being a long-term survivors, unconditional probability density is given
by
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P (c = 0;x; z) = S(t;x; z) = P (Y = 0;x) + P (Y = 1;x)P (t < τ ; z|Y = 1)
= (1− p) + pS1(t).
Likelihood Function for the Mixture Model
Then the likelihood function of the mixture of long-term survival and eventual de-
fault of ith firm at time t can be written as:
Li = [pif1i(t)]
c[(1− pi) + piS1i(t)]1−c (3.9)
where functions pi,f1i(t) and S1i(t) are p,f1(t) and S1(t) for individual firms.
The contribution of each state to the likelihood function is as follows:
c = 1 & Y = 1 company defaults with density pif1i(t)
c = 0 & Y = 1 company will default but survived in the sample piS1i(t)
c = 0 & Y = 0 long-term survivor (1− pi)
If we assume Y is known, the individual likelihood function would be (by
substituting equation 3.7 in):
Li = [(pih1i(t)S1i(t))
y]c[(1− pi)1−y(piS1i(t))y]1−c (3.10)




i (1− pi)1−yh1i(t)c(1− h1i(t))y−cS1i(t)y (3.11)
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EM-Algorithm
Note that we had assumed Y as given, while in reality we can only observe the
censoring indicator, c. EM-algorithm will serve us to overcome this obstacle.
EM is an iterative maximization algorithm composed of 2 steps. In the first
step E-Expectation, the likelihood equation shall be estimated with the best guess
of incomplete data and the expectation vector for the incomplete variable is formed.
In the second step M-Maximization, the parameters shall be estimated using the
expected values for the incomplete variable. These steps shall be repeated by insert-
ing estimated parameters back into the equation and maximizing until convergence
achieved.
In our case we shall start by making our best guess to calculate E(Yi):
E(Y ) =
{
1 if c = 1,
piS1i(t)
piS1i(t)+(1−pi) if c = 0.
After substituting expected values into our likelihood function we shall have:
Li = p
E(Y )
i (1− pi)1−E(Y )h1i(t)c(1− h1i(t))(E(Y )−c)S1i(t)E(Y ) (3.12)
Then in the maximization step, the above likelihood function would be maxi-
mized. During the search for convergence these two steps would be repeated, how-
ever the expectation steps shall not follow the above condition but extract the
expected values from the previous maximization step.
Parametric Estimation: Underlying Distribution
Until now, we have not specified a distribution function for neither the event of
default nor the timing of default. In a parametric estimation, which we shall follow
in our study, a specific distribution would be outlined for both of these events. We
shall specify a logistic distribution for the default event and for the time of default.
Then the probability that an individual company shall face the event of default







And the conditional hazard rate for an individual company depends on the






With these last specifications our mixture model is done.
3.2 An Improved Hazard Rate Model
Besides developing our new modeling framework, we have applied popular hazard
rate estimation as it is done by Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) and two
models of our own.
3.2.1 Valuation Framework
The likelihood function of hazard rate models to replace the equation (10) in our











where hit stands for the unconditional hazard rate of defaulting companies, Sit stands
for unconditional survival of survivor companies and y stands for the default event.
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Parametric Estimation: Underlying Distribution
The distribution function specified for the conditional hazard rate in these models





Notice that, since standard hazard rate models do not model the event but only





The CRSP dataset originally contains 24,147 publicly traded companies from the
period 1980-2007. 1,797 of the companies in our sample have gone bankrupt (7.44%)
during the selected period. Monthly observations for each company make a total of
2,447,813 observations in the initial dataset.
We have not considered the time frame before 1980. The reason is to eliminate
the bias formed in the data by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 which took effect
on October 1, 1979. Besides, since during the period from World War II through
the 1970s, with the exception of railroad failures, bankruptcy was not a major issue
in the US; we believe this exclusion shall not affect our research. During the 1970s,
there were only two corporate bankruptcies of prominence, Penn Central Trans-
portation Corporation in 1970 and W.T. Grant Company in 1975. However during
the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s record numbers of private and public bankruptcies,
of all types, were filed.
The first reduction in the data occurred during merging CRSP and Compustat
databases1. Then we have cleaned the missing variables, and we have omitted
the companies which were listed in different industries during our selection period.
These changes lowered the total number of companies to 18,505 and the number of
1After the merger there were 21,980 companies left.
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Table 4.1: Distribution of Companies within Industries
Total
Number of Number of Total Number of
Industry Bankrupt Healthy Number of Observations
Companies Companies Companies (Company
per Month)
1 705(10.11%) 6, 270(89.89%) 6, 975 438, 076
2 621(7.71%) 7, 433(92.29%) 8, 054 746, 877
3 190(12.30%) 1, 355(87.70%) 1, 545 134, 879
4 124(3.47%) 3, 447(96.53%) 3, 571 43, 005
Total 1, 640(8.14%) 18, 505(91.86%) 20, 145 1, 362, 837
This table lists the total number of active firms and bankruptcies and the total number of monthly observations
for 4 industry groups of our sample period. The percentages in parenthesis are as of the total number within an
industry group. The number of active firms may change for reasons other than the bankruptcies. Industries are
defined based on SIC codes. The groups are 1-Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Construction, Wholesale and
Retail Trade, Service Industries, 2-Manufacturing and Mineral, 3-Transportation, Communication and Utilities,
4-Finance, Insurance and Real Estate.
bankruptcies to 1,640 (8.14%). Besides the missing values, we have corrected for
outliers by truncating the data at 99% level. [HOW?] Table 4.1 and 4.2 provide the
layout of the dataset with respect to the industries and years2.
Following the convention, we shall use bankruptcy filings for default event.
Bankruptcy data are obtained from the US Bankruptcy Courts. Whenever a com-
pany files in any federal bankruptcy district, it is recorded as a bankrupt entity.
The source of the bankruptcy data is BankruptcyData.com3 database. Our original
database contains a total of 2,6594 public company bankruptcies for the selected
period. The database provides the Chapter 11 (reorganization) and Chapter 7 (liq-
uidation) filings for the companies. In some cases the same company may file for
more than one reorganization or both reorganization and liquidation; in those cases
we have accepted the first filing as the event of default.
2Figure 4.1 and 1.1 are based on the data in these tables.
3BankruptcyData.com is the premier business bankruptcy resource on the market which con-
tains over 400.000 bankruptcies of private and public firms.
4Bankruptcy.com database provide the company names and their 4-digit SIC codes. We have
merged CRSP/Compustat database and bankruptcy data through company names of the same
industry group. Out of 2,659 bankruptcies 1,797 was found in the CRSP/Compustat dataset.
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Table 4.2: Distribution of Companies within Years
Number of Number of Total Total
Year Healthy Bankrupt Number of Number of
Companies Companies Companies Observations
(Company per Month)
1980 2, 605(99.85%) 4(0.15%) 2, 609 28, 208
1981 3, 915(99.85%) 6(0.15%) 3, 921 35, 547
1982 4, 850(99.90%) 5(0.10%) 4, 855 50, 067
1983 5, 348(99.83%) 9(0.17%) 5, 357 58, 701
1984 5, 604(99.63%) 21(0.37%) 5, 625 63, 085
1985 5, 725(99.62%) 22(0.38%) 5, 747 63, 885
1986 6, 073(99.43%) 35(0.57%) 6, 108 65, 949
1987 6, 264(99.40%) 38(0.60%) 6, 302 70, 018
1988 6, 171(99.18%) 51(0.82%) 6, 222 69, 383
1989 5, 951(98.97%) 62(1.03%) 6, 013 67, 295
1990 5, 806(98.88%) 66(1.12%) 5, 872 66, 498
1991 5, 942(98.85%) 69(1.15%) 6, 011 66, 672
1992 6, 178(99.23%) 48(0.77%) 6, 226 69, 140
1993 7, 291(99.40%) 44(0.60%) 7, 335 75, 149
1994 7, 897(99.50%) 40(0.50%) 7, 937 88, 381
1995 8, 193(99.38%) 51(0.62%) 8, 244 90, 789
1996 8, 655(99.40%) 52(0.60%) 8, 707 95, 635
1997 8, 903(99.19%) 73(0.81%) 8, 976 99, 137
1998 8, 649(98.69%) 115(1.31%) 8, 764 97, 376
1999 8, 405(98.48%) 130(1.52%) 8, 535 92, 148
2000 8, 051(98.02%) 163(1.98%) 8, 214 90, 698
2001 7, 347(97.56%) 184(2.44%) 7, 531 84, 158
2002 6, 729(98.19%) 124(1.81%) 6, 853 77, 831
2003 6, 323(98.69%) 84(1.31%) 6, 407 72, 606
2004 6, 183(99.49%) 32(0.51%) 6, 215 70, 375
2005 6, 116(99.43%) 35(0.57%) 6, 151 69, 414
2006 5, 996(99.63%) 22(0.37%) 6, 018 68, 014
2007 5, 885(99.07%) 55(0.93%) 5, 940 65, 818
Total 18, 505 ∗ (91.86%) 1, 640(8.14%) 20, 145∗ 2, 011, 977
This table lists the total number of active firms, bankruptcies and the total number of observations for every year
of our sample period. The percentages in parenthesis are as of the total company number within that year. The
number of active firms may change for reasons other than the bankruptcies.
*18,505 is the total number of healthy companies and 20,145 is the total number of all companies in the entire
dataset, not the column totals.
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Figure 4.1: Bankruptcies by Industry Group
The figure depicts the values in Table 4.1. It shows the number of healthy and
bankrupt companies within each industry group for the period 1980-2007. The
percentage of bankruptcies are defined as of each industry. The highest percentage
is observed in the third industry group.
The firm level accounting data has been extracted from quarterly COMPUS-
TAT files, while the market data has been taken from CRSP database. In order to
make sure the estimation covers the data that is available to market participants at
the specified time, we have lagged all the corporate data by one quarter.
We have used the following set of covariates in our analysis:
4.2 Firm Specific Covariates
4.2.1 Accounting Variables
The variables that are employed by Altman (1968) in his Z-score are as follows:
WC/TA: Working capital to total assets ratio is a liquidity measure which
shows how easily the firm can access cash. Both working capital and total asset
values are balance sheet values.
27
RE/TA: Retained earnings to total assets ratio is a cumulative profitability
measure which shows the company’s ability to accumulate earnings using its total
assets. It also measures the leverage of the company. Firms with higher RE/TA
ratio have financed their assets through profits not debt.
EBIT/TA: Earnings before interest and taxes to total assets is a productivity
measure independent of tax and debt factors. EBIT is often known as an approx-
imation of cash from operations. The ratio thus, shows the ability of the firm to
operate its assets to generate earnings, in other words shows the productivity of
assets.
MVE/TL: Market value of equity to book value of total liabilities adds market
dimension to the analysis. A higher market value of equity known as market capi-
talization of a firm compared to its outstanding obligations indicates the market’s
belief in its solid financial position.
S/TA: Sales to total assets is an efficiency ratio known as the asset turnover
ratio. It shows how efficiently the company activates its assets to generate sales.
Z-Score: The Z-Score is calculated based on the original calculation proposed
by Altman (1968) to measure the financial health of the company in our analysis.
As expected healthy companies demonstrate superior z-scores. (Table 4.5 It is a
combination of the five financial ratios stated above, based on the weights of multiple
discriminant analysis.
The variables that are introduced by Zmijewski (1984) to the bankruptcy
literature:
TL/TA: Total liabilities to total assets is the leverage ratio named debt ratio
which measures how much the company rely on debt to finance its assets.
CA/CL: Current assets to current liabilities is the liquidity ratio named current
ratio which measures the company’s ability to meet its short term debt obligations.
NI/TA: Net income to total assets is the stiprofitability ratio known as return
on assets. It tells what earnings are generated from invested capital.
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All of the accounting variables are calculated with the data from Compustat,
except MVETL. The data used to calculate market value of equity is extracted from
CRSP.
4.2.2 Distance to Default
The variable that is introduced by Merton (1974) to the bankruptcy literature:
DD: Distance to default is a measure of the difference between the asset value
of the firm and the face value of its debt scaled by the standard deviation of the
firm’s asset value. It is used as a practitioner model by Moody’s KMV yet it is
originated from Merton’s (1974) structural default model. It enters to the recent
literature under the name of ”distance to default” as done by Campbell et al.
(2008), Bharath and Shumway (2008), Das et al. (2007), Duffie et al. (2007),
Vassalou and Xing (2004), and Da and Gao (2008). Hillegesit et al. (2004), on
the other hand named a similar measure as ”BSM-probability”.
Merton (1974) defines payoffs to equity as a call option on the firm’s total
asset value, since equity holders have limited liability for the debt payments in case
of a bankruptcy. He defines the face value of the firm’s liabilities as the strike price
of the call option and the option expires at time T when the debt matures. At time
T, two scenarios possible: If the assets are higher than the liabilities of the company,
the shareholders will exercise their option and their pay off would be what is left
after paying the debtholders. Otherwise, they will let the option expire, in other
words, the firm files for bankruptcy and the payoff to the shareholders is zero. Then,
in Merton’s theory, value of the equity follows the following European call option
framework:
E = Aφ(d1)− e−rTDφ(d2)
d1 =










where E is the market value of the equity, A is the total value of assets, φ() denotes
the standard normal distribution function, r is the risk-free interest rate, T is the
expiration date, D is the face value of debt, and σA is the asset volatility of the firm.
Distance to default is, then, defined as,
DD =






where µA is the expected value for the return on the firm’s assets.
Our construction of the distance to default variable is along the lines used by
Hillegeist et al. (2004), Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Campbell et al. (2008)
We have defined E as the market value of equity, and A as the market value of
assets, which is the total of book value of the liabilities and the market value of the
equity. For the strike price, face value of debt, D, we use the KMV definition of
short-term liabilities plus one half of long-term liabilities. This convention is also
used by many scholars because it is a simple way to take account of the fact that
long-term debt may not mature until after the horizon of the distance to default
calculation. Risk-free rate is the monthly 1-year treasury bill rate as Hillegeist et al.
(2004) and as Shumway and Bharath (2008) did, because the expiration time, T ,
is defined as one year. For µA, we have implemented the empirical proxy, 0.6, used
by Campbell et al. (2008) They suggest a common expected return for all stocks is
better than a noisily estimated stock-specific number offered by other scholars, and
calculated 0.6 from the historical returns.
4.2.3 Market Variables
Market variables are calculated from the CRSP data items. The market variables
defined by Shumway (2001) are as follows:
EXRET: Excess return is measured as the difference between the real market
return on the firm and the value-weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX index return.
SIGMA: Sigma is the standard deviation of each firm’s stock returns. We have
followed Shumway (2001) in the calculation. Each stock’s monthly returns in year
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t− 1 are regressed on the value- weighted NYSE/AMEX index return for the same
year. The firm’s sigma for year t is the standard deviation of the residual of this
regression.
RSIZE: Relative size is calculated as the logarithm of each firm’s equity value
measured by the market capitalization divided by the total NYSE/AMEX market
equity value.
Firm’s equity value for a month is its stock price times the number of shares
outstanding at the end of the month. The stock price used is the last non-missing
closing price of the security for the last trading day of the month. If unavailable, it
is replaced with a bid/ask average.
4.3 Industry Specific Covariates
Fixed Effects: We have defined four industry groups based on company SIC codes.
Two industries, manufacturing and finance, have received special treatment in the
earlier studies. Manufacturing sector happened to be the center of the attention for
the default analysis as Altman (1968) used only manufacturing companies in his
Z-score calculation. On the other hand the financial sector used to be left out. SIC
codes and related industries are given in Table 4.3. Based on Chava and Jarrow’s
(2006) industry classification we have converted these SIC codes into four industry
groups, manufacturing and finance being two of them. Table 4.4 shows these groups.
4.4 Market Specific Covariates
4 UR: The percentage change in the unemployment rate from the previous
year is used to capture the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations. Unemployment
rate is the percentage of the labor force that is not employed. The population is
defined as 16 years and older civilian non institutional population. The data is
extracted from Census Bureau.
31
Table 4.3: Industry Classification of SIC Codes
SIC Code Industry Name
< 1000 Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
1000− 1500 Mineral Industries
1500− 1800 Construction Industries
2000− 4000 Manufacturing
4000− 5000 Transportation, Communications, and Utilities
5000− 5200 Wholesale Trade
5200− 6000 Retail Trade
6000− 6800 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
7000− 8900 Service Industries
9100− 10000 Public Administration
This table lists the industry names for 4-digit SIC codes. According to SIC classification, from 0 to 10,000, there
are ten major industries.
Table 4.4: Fixed Effects: Four Industry Groups Defined as Fixed Effects
Industry Code Industry
1 Agriculture,Forestry and Fisheries,Construction,
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Service Industries
2 Manufacturing and Mineral Industries
3 Transportation, Communication and Utilities
4 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
This table lists the industry classification used in fixed effect specification. Chava and Jarrow’s (2006) have used
the same classification as fixed effects.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics for Covariates
Bankrupt Healthy All
Variable Companies Companies Companies
Names Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max
WCTA 0.366 (0.367) 0.374 (0.368) −0.512 1.005
RETA 0.013 (0.413) 0.021 (0.414) −0.779 0.886
EBITTA 0.025 (0.047) 0.026 (0.047) −0.065 0.108
STA 0.310 (0.241) 0.310 (0.242) −0.303 0.795
MVETL 2.303 (3.180) 3.17 (3.61) −5.579 10.54871
Z − Score 1.937 (2) 2.77 (2.27) −3.530 9.925717
CLCA 0.738 (0.500) 0.739 (0.503) −0.427 1.537
NITA 0.003 (0.027) 0.003 (0.027) −0.049 0.059
TLTA 0.532 (0.279) 0.525 (0.277) −0.272 1.324
EXRET −0.007 (0.126) −0.006 (0.124) −0.289 0.271
SIGMA 0.131 (0.079) 0.128 (0.078) 0 0.321
RSIZE −10.914 (2.349) −10.886 (2.361) −16.787 0.000
4UR −0.007 (0.120) −0.006 (0.120) −0.219 0.276
lag4G 0.060 (0.026) 0.060 (0.025) 0 0.157
DD 0.3494815 (0.200) 0.441 (0.227) 0.019 1
I1 0.280 (0.449) 0.273 (0.446) 0 1
I2 0.463 (0.499) 0.464 (0.499) 0 1
I3 0.083 (0.276) 0.083 (0.275) 0 1
I4 0.173 (0.379) 0.181 (0.385) 0 1
# of obs. 148, 538 1, 863, 439 2, 011, 977
The following covariates are presented in this table: Working capital to total assets, WC/TA; Retained earnings to
total assets, RE/TA; Earnings before interest and tax to total assets, EBIT/TA; Sales to total assets, S/TA;
Market value of equity to total liabilities, MVE/TL; Z − score (calculated as Z = 1.2WC/TA + 1.4RE/TA +
3.3EBIT/TA + .6MVE/TL + .999S/TA); Current liabilities to current assets, CL/CA; Net income to total assets,
NI/TA; Total liabilities to total assets, TL/TA; Excess return, EXRET ; SIGMA; Relative Size, RSIZE; The
change in unemployment rate, ∆UR; One year lag of the change in government spending, lag∆G; Distance to
Default, DD and Industry dummies, I1 − I4. A total of 2,011,977 monthly observations are available, of which
148,538 are for bankrupt companies. Mean and the standard deviation of each predictor is calculated for bankrupt
and non-bankrupt company observations. Minimum and maximum values are delivered for the entire dataset.
lag4 G: One year lag of the percentage change in the government spending
from the last year is included in the model as a proxy for the stimulus packages. Cur-
rent stimulus packages are specific to the recession, however government spending,
being one of the major fiscal policy tools, in general aims to stimulate the economy.
This variable displays if ever the government spending can reduce the bankruptcies.
The data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The descriptive statistics for





Initially, named Model-1 and Model-2, two separate specifications for the covariate
vectors have been identified for the mixture model. In the first specification, Model
1, the event of default covariates are leverage measured by TL/TA, profitability
measured by NI/TA and solvency measured by MVE/TL1. The variables in this
part, although time-varying originally, are taken fixed at t0 based on the mixture
model specification. How informative today’s knowledge is with respect to eventual
default of the company is explained in this part. Therefore we have considered
its leverage, the debt burden of the company, its profitability and its ability to
pay its debt. The timing of default covariates are, in addition to those in the first
part, liquidity measured by WC/TA, productivity measured by EBIT/TA, efficiency
measured by S/TA, excess return, volatility measured by SIGMA, the relative size,
unemployment rate, government spending and the industry indicators.
In the other mixture model specification, Model-2, instead of the leverage,
profitability and solvency, only Z-Score, for being a combination of financial ra-
tios, is used in the first part and in the second part the leverage and solvency are
omitted with the inclusion of Z-score, leaving liquidity, productivity, efficiency, ex-
1We have checked for the collinearity between TL/TA and MVETL, and we did not find a high
correlation. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is 1.89, way below the cut-off value of 10.
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cess return, volatility, relative size, unemployment rate, government spending and
industry indicators intact.
The whole set of estimates turn out to be significant at the 5 % level for the
both models. Table 5.2 presents the two models.
Before analyzing the results, our expectations for the event and timing of
default ought to be discussed. In the event part, leverage is supposed to have an
inclining effect on the probability of default, on the other hand the case is vice versa
for profitability, solvency and z-score, which measures the financial health.
In the intensity part, the timing of default gets sooner when the company
has higher leverage, implying a positive sign on leverage; it gets later when the
company is healthier, more productive, more solvent, more efficient, more liquid
and profitable, implying a negative sign for the rest of accounting variables. For
the market variables, excess return and relative size supposed to be inversely re-
lated to the default intensity, notwithstanding default intensity would be higher
during more volatile circumstances. As for the macro variable unemployment rate,
severe macroeconomic conditions are anticipated to raise the default probability,
while government spending would eliminate the defaults. Table 5.1 summarizes the
expectations.
Table 5.2 presents the coefficients for both mixture models, the absolute value
of z statistics are parenthesized. The signs in both models suit the expectations
excluding solvency in the first part and the leverage in the second part of Model 1
and relative size in Model 2. With 7.38% estimated default probability, both are
good predictors for the real default rate of 8.14% (Table 4.2), Model-1 is selected
for comparison to the hazard rate model because of its higher log-likelihood2, lower
AIC3 and higher pseudo−R2 4 values.
Before getting into the comparison, the coefficients on Model 1 lay out the
forces behind the default of a company. Productivity (-6.66) and the profitability
2Probabilities are always less than one, so log likelihoods are negative
3AIC is computed as AIC = (−2lnL+2k)N where lnL is the overall likelihood reported by the
regression, k is the number of parameters of the model and N is the number of observations.
4The pseudo−R2s reported in the table are estimated as the square of the correlation between
the observed response and the predicted response based on the calculation suggested by Cox.
(1992)
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Table 5.1: Expected Signs for The Covariates




Z − Score Financial Health Negative








EXRET Excess Return Negative
SIGMA Volatility Positive
RSIZE Relative Size Negative
4UR Unemployment Rate Positive
lag4G Government Spending -1 Year Ago Negative
DD Distance to Default Negative
This table presents the expected relationship between the bankruptcy indicator and the predictor variables. The
expectations are derived from literature and general economic intuition.
(-15.59) with the highest coefficients proved the virtue of macroeconomic theory. It
is only by being more productive, the business can survive in competitive markets,
and relieves from distress. Efficiency (-0.70) and liquidity (-0.73) also play a critical
role besides the firm’s ability to beat the market (excess return:-1.86). However,
size has a limited impact compared to the rest (0.06). As we have expected, a
higher unemployment rate, signaling the vulnerability of the economy increases the
likelihood of the company to fail. (3.13) Anticipated, yet the most surprising result
is coming from the government spending (-21.19): Federal and local government
incentives and expenditures can change a company’s fate, and reduce the default
probability significantly. Since the relationship of dependent variable bankruptcy
and the independent variables are not a linear one, it is essential to note that the
coefficients do not refer to constant increases in the probability of default. The
exponential values of the coefficients would refer to the changes in the odds of default
as the probabilities defined to follow a logistic distribution. Therefore we avoid to
make statements regarding the numerical change in default probability when we
mention the coefficients of the variables, rather we compare the coefficients with





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.3: Odds Ratios for Model 1
Odds of Odds of Odds of Odds of
Default/ Non-Default/ Default/ Non-Default/
Non-Default Default Non-Default Default
The event of default The time of default
Accounting var Market var
TLTA 3.48 EXRET 5.26
NITA 7.14 SIGMA 5.32
MVETL 1.04 RSIZE 1.06
The time of default Macro var
Accounting var 4 UR 22.93
TLTA 2.76 lag 4 G 0 ∞
NITA 0 ∞ Industry var
MVETL 1.39 I1 25.00
WCTA 2.08 I2 25.00
EBITTA 0 ∞ I3 33.33
STA 2.00 I4 50.00
This table presents odds ratios for the Mixture Model 1. There are two types of odds ratio reported in the table:
odds of default to non-default and odds of non-default to default. Basically these two ratios are the inverted version
of the other. Because of that we have printed the one that is easier to read and interpret which is the one bigger
than 1. For instance, 3.48 for TLTA (Total Liabilities to Total Assets) can be interpreted as, when the TLTA ratio
for a company goes up by one unit, the odds of default to non-default raises by 3.48 times.
understand the impact of each variable on the default probability for our model, we
will look at the change in the odds of going bankrupt vs. staying in the market by
a unit change in each covariate. As can be seen while some covariates increases the
odd of bankruptcy, some will reduce it. Our key variables productivity, profitability
and government stimulus help keep the company away from bankruptcy.
Model 1 analyzing the event and timing of default at the same time offers a
more inclusive result. We have defined whether the company files for bankruptcy
or not, independent from the timing, depends on company’s ability to service its
debt the debt. Model 1 says that 1-unit increase in leverage increases the odds of
bankruptcy 3.48 times, while, 1-unit increase in the profitability will increase its
likelihood to stay healthy 7.14 times. Any change in solvency turns out to keep the
odds of going bankrupt almost constant.
With respect to the timing of the default, the leverage increase the default
intensity 2.76 times, while sigma raise it 5.32 times. The increase in unemployment
rate, because of the recessive reflections at the macro level will push up the odds
of failure by 22.93 times. On the other hand the improvement in solvency, by 1.39
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Figure 5.1: Estimated Hazard Rates
Hazard rates are estimated by Mixture Model-1 in Table 5.2.
times, in liquidity, by 2.08 times and in excess return, by 5.26 times improves the
odds of staying healthy. The key ingredients in this combination are the productivity
(EBIT/TA), profitability (NI/TA) and the government stimulus (lag 4 G). A one-
unit increase in any of these will reduce the default probability to zero.
Industry dummies suggest that overall market movement is in the direction
of reducing bankruptcy and developing a healthier environment for the companies,
however out of all sectors, financial sector, being the backbone of the monetary econ-
omy, provides more protection against bankruptcies. Any company in the financial
sector is less likely to default compared to rest of the companies. One reason maybe
the extra government protection afforded to these firms, which can also be observed
in today’s economic crisis.
The comparison models models assume logistic distribution for the intensity
of default. In the literature it is named as hazard, survival, duration or multi period
logit models. We have used the name hazard. Table 5.2 displays five models side by
side, first two being the mixture models, the last three being the hazard rate mod-
els. The second standard hazard rate model (HR2), is exact the same statistical
specification of Shumway (2001) and the third hazard rate model (HR3) is Chava
and Jarrow’s (2004) model which adds dummy variables to Shumway’s specifica-
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tion, yet did not change the sign and magnitude of original coefficients significantly.
Shumway’s model is improved in the literature to include other variables and/or
dummy variables. The fourth hazard rate model (HR4) adds z-score. The first
hazard rate model (HR1) in Table 5.2 contains all of the covariates in Model 1 in-
cluding dummies. Although the statistical specification is exactly the same, with the
inclusion of financial companies to the dataset, the coverage of the years after 1992
and the selection of significant covariates, HR1 is already improved with respect to
Shumway’s model (HR2) and Chava and Jarrow’s model (HR3). The Pseudo−R2s
delivered by the Shumway’s model (HR2), and Chava and Jarrow’s model (HR3),
and HR4 models are less than HR1’s, indicating the lack of information embedded.
The first advantage of mixture model over hazard rate model is its ability to
measure the event and timing of the default at the same time. The results for Model
1 stresses the impact of the leverage on the default probability. The increase in the
leverage ratio (TL/TA) by 1 unit produces an increase of 1.02 in the logarithm of
default probability5. Solvency has a moderately lower stimulus on the default rate,
though positive contrary to negative expectations with 0.08 logarithmic increase in
default rate by one-unit increase in solvency ratio (MVE/TL)6. Yet the effect of
profitability (NI/TA) is negative, by increasing the odds of health 7.14 times.
Table 5.2 presents the differences between Model 1 and HR1. Model 1 proposes
a lower weight on leverage (1.02 in Model 1 vs. 2.51 in HR1) and profitability (-15.59
in Model 1 vs. -21.01 in HR1), and a higher weight on liquidity (-0.73 in Model 1 vs.
-0.21 in HR1), productivity (-6.66 in Model 1 vs. -2.12 in HR1) and efficiency (-0.70
in Model 1 vs. -0.16 in HR1) while solvency (-0.33 in Model 1 vs. -0.33 in HR1)
has the same effect in both. With respect to market variables, in HR1 model excess
return (-1.68 in Model 1 vs. -1.95 in HR1) and sigma (1.67 in Model 1 vs. 5.85 in
HR1) are more stressed, yet relative size (0.06 in Model 1 vs. -0.17 in HR1) has a
contradictory impact, while HR1 model states smaller companies are more likely to
default, Model 1 proposes the opposite. Instead of market variables, Model 1 model
give more importance to macro variables, the change in unemployment rate (3.13
in Model 1 vs. 1.96 in HR1) and the government spending (-21.19 in Model 1 vs.
-10.41 in HR1).
5From Table 5.2. Related odds ratio is 3.48. Likelihood of default goes up by 3.48, by one-unit
change in leverage ratio.
6From Table 5.2. Related odds ratio is 1.04.
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Figure 5.2: Actual vs. Predicted Default Rates
The figure shows the actual vs. estimated default rates for the period 1980-2007.
The default is defined as the Chapter 7 or 11 filing of the company. The predicted
rates are calculated using the fitted values of models Model 1 and HR1 in Table 5.2.
Figure 5.2 compares the model fit for the two models: Model 1 and HR1. The
real annual frequencies of bankruptcies are plotted by the blue line. The red line
plots the annual frequencies estimated by the first model, while the green line shows
the estimation of HR1. The graph presents Model 1 as a better fit. The average
for the real bankruptcies is 0.85% annually, while the same average for Model 1 is
0.95%, it is 1.01% for HR1, displaying the overestimation by the hazard rate model.
Another contribution of our model is the introduction of the unemployment
rate as a macro variable to the default rate modeling. Macro economic variation
affects the default intensity; as a proxy to the economic fluctuations an upward trend
in unemployment rate is considered to be one of the leading indicators of economic
slow-downs. Therefore a positive change in unemployment expected to increase the
default intensity, and it happened to be so. One percent rise in unemployment rate
is found to augment the logarithm of default intensity by 3.13.
In majority of earlier studies a special care is given to the industry clusters ei-
ther through industry dummies or frailties, industry dummies are used in our model
as well. The coefficients of the four industry dummies are significantly negative. The
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negative coefficients of all dummies imply the market-wide soundness: if everything
else set to zero (no variables included in the model), the likelihood of bankruptcy is
going down for the entire set of companies. It is noteworthy that the coefficient on
the dummy for industry group 4, finance, insurance and real estate sector, is much
larger than the rest in absolute value, proposing financial companies are less likely
to default.
As clearly seen in the table, in HR models, the introduction of z-score and
distance to default to the Shumway’s model improves the pseudo-R2 slightly, yet
it is still far from the mixture model specification, the the pseudo-R2 suggests the
superiority of our model over HR.
We have formed 10 portfolios ranking the annualized estimated probabilities
for 2003. Having roughly 641 companies in each portfolio, 6,407 was the total
number of companies in 2003. 1st portfolio containing the riskiest 641 firms, from
portfolio 1 to 10, the default probability was decreasing. Table 5.4 presents the
distribution of actual failures within our in-sample prediction period. It is in-sample,
because even though the companies are sorted with respect to their estimated default
probabilities of 2003, the whole sample of 1980-2007 is used for estimations. We
will use a restricted sample in out-of-sample prediction part. In 2003 there were
84 failures, in 2004 there were 32 failures, in 2005 there were 35 failures, in 2006
there were 22 failures, and in 2007 there were 55 failures where 13 of which were
bankruptcies of new companies. We have observed all of the 215 companies to
bankrupt in five years in our 1st portfolio. Since there is no way to include the
companies that are not established yet, it is fair to state our model predicts all
bankruptcies over four year period. In order to compare the predictive power of
our model to the hazard rate model, from the same sample year with the same
companies, we have formed another set of 10 portfolios using the annualized default
rates estimated by hazard rate models this time. 1st portfolio would contain the
riskiest 10% of the companies again, but the risk is measured by hazard rate models.
Table 5.4 presents the distribution of failures among the sets of portfolios. Panel
A is for Model-1 of Table 5.2, while Panel B shows the estimation with HR1 of
Table 5.2 and Panel C displays HR2- Shumway’s model of Table 5.2. 1st portfolio of
HR1 can identify 109 failures while 1st portfolio of Shumway’s model identifies 199
failures out of 215 failures. Thus our model outperforms that of Shumway (2001).
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Table 5.4: Distribution of Bankruptcies for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Total number of companies 6, 407 6, 215 6, 151 6, 018 5, 940
Total number of bankruptcies 84 32 35 22 55 228
Bankruptcies of new companies 0 0 0 0 13
Bankruptcies of old companies 84 32 35 22 42 215
Panel A - Model 1
Bankruptcies from 1st portfolio 84 32 35 22 42 215
Bankruptcies from 2nd portfolio 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bankruptcies from 3rd portfolio 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bankruptcies from 4th portfolio 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bankruptcies from 5th portfolio 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bankruptcies from 6th portfolio 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bankruptcies from 7th portfolio 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bankruptcies from 8th portfolio 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bankruptcies from 9th portfolio 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bankruptcies from 10th portfolio 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel B - HR1
Bankruptcies from 1st portfolio 71 20 11 3 4 109
Bankruptcies from 2nd portfolio 7 8 7 5 8 35
Bankruptcies from 3rd portfolio 1 1 4 1 4 11
Bankruptcies from 4th portfolio 2 1 2 5 9 19
Bankruptcies from 5th portfolio 0 0 0 1 1 2
Bankruptcies from 6th portfolio 2 0 4 1 5 12
Bankruptcies from 7th portfolio 0 2 3 4 6 15
Bankruptcies from 8th portfolio 1 0 1 1 1 4
Bankruptcies from 9th portfolio 0 0 2 1 2 5
Bankruptcies from 10th portfolio 0 0 1 0 2 3
Panel C - HR2
Bankruptcies from 1st portfolio 69 22 33 35 40 199
Bankruptcies from 2nd portfolio 7 4 12 18 24 65
Bankruptcies from 3rd portfolio 4 2 2 6 10 24
Bankruptcies from 4th portfolio 0 2 6 10 16 34
Bankruptcies from 5th portfolio 2 1 4 5 12 24
Bankruptcies from 6th portfolio 1 0 1 3 7 12
Bankruptcies from 7th portfolio 1 0 2 4 9 16
Bankruptcies from 8th portfolio 0 1 3 4 6 14
Bankruptcies from 9th portfolio 0 0 3 3 3 9
Bankruptcies from 10th portfolio 0 0 1 1 4 6
This table displays that all of the failures through 2004-2007 have been predicted by our model. Ten portfolios are
formed in 2003 based on annualized default probabilities estimated by Model 1 in Table 5.2. There are equal number
of companies in each portfolio. Panel A presents upcoming failures within these portfolios. Panel B compares the
ten portfolios formed again in 2003 but based on annualized default probabilities of HR1 estimation in Table 5.2.
Panel C compares the ten portfolios formed again in 2003 but based on annualized default probabilities of HR2
estimation in Table 5.2. All of the companies filed for bankruptcy within the following 3 years were listed in the
1st portfolio of Model 1 estimation. New companies are defined as the companies established later during 2004 to
2007, which by default can not enter our portfolio selection process in 2003. Old companies are the ones established
before 2004.
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Table 5.5: Mixture Model on Non-Financial and Financial Companies
All Non-Financial Financial
Variable Companies Companies Companies
Names Est. (Z) Est. (Z) Est. (Z)
The Event of Default
TLTA 1.25 (11.85) 1.21 (10.66) 2.10 (6.06)
NITA −1.95 (2.30) −2.37 (2.69) −5.66 (1.32)
MVETL 0.04 (4.71) 0.02 (1.88) 0.14 (4.65)
The Time of Default
TLTA 1.02 (10.78) 0.67 (6.60) 1.29 (2.81)
NITA −15.59 (11.69) −12.98 (9.26) −31.35 (5.96)
MVETL −0.33 (22.39) −0.36 (21.40) −0.13 (3.23)
WCTA −0.73 (10.88) −1.28 (16.20) −0.12 (0.68)
EBITTA −6.66 (8.81) −8.76 (10.64) 3.12 (1.02)
STA −0.70 (5.86) −0.67 (5.26) 0.39 (0.76)
EXRET −1.68 (11.74) −1.63 (10.82) −1.28 (2.56)
SIGMA 1.67 (5.65) 1.52 (4.93) 3.74 (3.46)
RSIZE 0.06 (5.71) 0.05 (4.64) −0.03 (0.91)
4UR 3.13 (14.54) 2.84 (12.62) 4.18 (4.82)
lag4G −21.19 (15.34) −20.05 (13.97) −25.01 (4.12)
I1 −3.12 (35.69) −2.96 (31.59)
I2 −3.35 (38.80) −3.16 (34.35)
I3 −3.37 (34.90) −3.17 (31.13)
I4 −3.84 (34.65)
Constant −5.40 (18.05)
# of obs. 2,011,977 1,662,963 349,014
Log L -13,242.75 -11,882.44 -1,075.85
AIC 0.01318 0.01431 0.00625
Pseudo−R2 0.06544 0.06948 0.04388
Default
Probability 7.38% 8.11% 3.11%
This table reports results from mixture Model 1 of bankruptcy indicator on predictor variables for all companies in
the first column, non-financial companies in the second column and for the financial companies in the third column.
The default probability and default intensity are defined to follow a logistic distribution in Model 1. The absolute
value of z-statistics are reported in parenthesis. A higher log-likelihood, a lower AIC or a higher R2 values of a
model indicate a better fit for the data.
Next, in order to clarify possible concerns regarding the impact of financial
companies on our model, we have estimated Model-1 for non-financial companies
first and then for only financial companies. We have not defined sub-industry groups
within financial companies, therefore the mixture model on financial companies does
not contain the industry dummies, while the model on non-financial companies has
three industry indicators without financials. Table 5.5 displays the results. It is
clearly seen that the inclusion of financial companies do not present any bias to our
estimation.
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Lastly, we have analyzed the contribution of distance to default to hazard rate
and mixture models. Originated from Merton’s (1974) structural default model,
distance to default is widely used in the market. Bharath and Shumway (2008)
analyze the effect of two different distance to default measures by estimating different
hazard rate models by adding extra variables besides distance to default measures
and found the distance to default measure to be helpful besides other predictors but
not alone. Campbell et al. (2008) estimated a DD-only model and DD included
full model and concluded that distance to default does not improve his model at all.
In our estimation, DD is significant yet does not improve the model significantly
consistent with the works mentioned.
We have run several models including distance to default as a predictor of
failure. Table 5.6 presents the results from those models. First we ran a mixture
model with a constant and distance to default as the only predictor of both event
and timing of default. ((1) in Table 5.6) Then we added industry dummies to
the timing part ((2) in Table 5.6), and then we ran mixture model 1 of Table 5.2
by adding distance to default on both parts of the model ((3) in Table 5.6). We
followed the same order for hazard rate models. First we ran a multi-period logistic
regression on a constant and distance to default only. ((4) in Table 5.6) Then we
added industry dummies ((5) in Table 5.6) to this model, and then we ran HR1 of
Table 5.2 by adding distance to default ((6) in Table 5.6). We have added distance
to default to Shumway’s model (2001) ((7) in Table 5.6) and Chava and Jarrow’s
model (2004)((8) in Table 5.6). The results shows that distance to default is mostly
a significant predictor of failure, however it does not improve the existing models
much with respect to model fitting. Especially it barely contributes to our model,
so we did not see any virtue to add distance to default to our model specification.
5.2 Out-of-Sample Prediction
In order to measure the out of sample prediction power of our model, we have
estimated the conditional probability of default in 6 months, 1, 2 and 3 years using
the lagged values of our covariates as Campbell et al. (2008) did. In particular,
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Table 5.6: Distance to Default Models
Panel A - Mixture Models
(1) (2) (3)
Cons. Ind. Dummies Model-1
+ + +
DD DD DD
The Event of Default
DD 0.29 0.40 0.19
(4.09) (5.57) (1.85)
The Time of Default
DD −6.04 −5.99 −0.37
(61.39) (60.76) (2.67)
LogL −14, 470.42 −14, 418.38 −13, 239.96
AIC 0.01439 0.01434 0.01318
Pseudo−R2 0.04953 0.05225 0.06558
Panel B - Hazard Rate Models
(4) (5) (6) (7) 8
Cons. Ind. Dummies HR1 Shumway C&J
+ + + + +
DD DD DD DD DD
DD −5.50 −5.35 1.16 0.30 0.40
(30.80) (29.83) (6.47) (1.64) (2.12)
LogL −12, 646.96 −12, 595.20 −10, 104.30 −10, 374.89 −10, 348.49
AIC 0.01257 0.01253 0.01006 0.01032 0.01030
Pseudo−R2 0.00184 0.00190 0.01590 0.01186 0.01189
This table reports the coefficient on distance to default, log-likelihood, Akaike Information Criteria and Pseudo−
R2for various models incorporating distance to default. Panel A presents the mixture models, and Panel B presents
the hazard rate models. (1) runs a mixture model with a constant and distance to default as a predictor for both
event and timing of default. (2) runs a mixture model with a distance to default as a predictor for both event and
timing of default and industry dummies on the timing part. (3) runs Model 1 in Table 5.2 including distance to
default on both event and timing parts. (4) runs a hazard rate model with a constant and distance to default as
predictor variables. (5) runs a hazard rate model with distance to default and industry dummies. (6) runs HR1 in
Table 5.2 adding distance to default as predictor. (7) runs Shumway’s model (2001) adding distance to default. (8)
runs Chava and Jarrow’s model (2004) adding distance to default. The absolute value of z-statistics are reported
in parenthesis. A higher log-likelihood, a lower AIC or a higher R2 values of a model indicate a better fit for the
data.
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the conditional hazard rate of an individual company defined to depend on the






The lagged values are calculated at 6 months, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years; j being
6, 12, 24 and 36 in estimation. The probability of eventual default did not change






For each estimation the same sample period, 1980-2003, has been used. In the
6 months forecast, the failures starting from the second half of 1980 to the end of
first half of 2003 are predicted using the 1980-2003 sample. In one year forecast, the
failures from 1981 to 2004 are estimated by the predictors of 1980 to 2003. In two
year forecast the failures of 1982 to 2005 are estimated by the predictors of 1980 to
2003 and lastly the failures of 1983 to 2006 are estimated by the predictors of 1980
to 2003. Table 5.7 presents the regression results.
The reason behind the improvement in the loglikelihood as the lag months
increase is the reduction in the sample size. Akaike information criteria (AIC)
and Pseudo − R2 would be better criteria to compare the models. As the forecast
covers longer periods, the model slightly loses its informative power, shown by rising
AIC values, and lower Pseudo − R2’s. It is still powerful even in the three year
hold out sample period. With respect to AIC zero-month model is the best fit for
the data. The six month prediction has a higher Pseudo − R2 than our original
estimation, indicating the time lag in the information flow from the variables to
default event. This is reasonable considering most of our variables are accounting
and macro variables, which are likely to affect later. Notice that even in the 3
year forecast most of the covariates are still significant proving the out-of-sample
prediction power of our model.
Another way frequently used in the industry to measure the predictive power
of a default model is to graph a ‘power curve’ or a CAP (Cumulative Accuracy
Profile) curve comparing the model’s prediction of default rate from 0% to 100%
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Table 5.7: Mixture Model on Lagged Values
Lag (Months) 0 6 12 24 36
The Event of Default
TLTA 1.22 0.88 0.78 0.67 0.75
(11.18) (7.8) (6.95) (5.66) (5.91)
NITA −1.93 −2.92 −3.24 −3.43 −3.18
(2.18) (3.24) (3.58) (3.61) (3.1)
MVETL 0 0 0 0 0
(4.32) (1.33) (0.25) (1.03) (0.41)
The Time of Default
TLTA 0.98 0.59 0.36 0.31 0.4
(9.93) (5.33) (3.16) (2.44) (2.94)
NITA −13.49 −9.29 −9.51 −5.41 −3.45
(9.57) (6.57) (6.21) (3.58) (2.11)
MVETL −0.28 −0.22 −0.14 −0.09 −.05
(21.5) (15.75) (13.1) (8.48) (4.33)
WCTA −0.73 −0.62 −0.2 0.13 0.18
(10.43) (7.76) (2.37) (1.4) (1.79)
EBITTA −6.75 −4.83 −3.34 −1.63 −1.62
(8.44) (5.48) (3.31) (1.54) (1.42)
STA −0.78 −0.66 −0.75 −0.69 −0.57
(6.19) (4.88) (5.56) (4.79) (3.71)
EXRET −1.64 −0.86 −1.03 −0.36 −0.34
(10.96) (5.42) (6.21) (1.96) (1.64)
SIGMA 1.91 5.59 4.97 4.33 2.81
(6.13) (14.89) (13.2) (10.85) (6.42)
RSIZE 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07
(4.48) (7.94) (7.97) (6.8) (5.43)
4UR 3.12 3.93 3.46 3.05 1.71
(13.37) (16.2) (14.7) (11.52) (5.64)
lag4G −22.28 −22.53 −19.6 −20.9 −20.3
(15.77) (16.32) (14.7) (15.82) (16.01)
I1 −3.12 −2.78 −2.6 −2.42 −2.48
(34.25) (29.83) (28.1) (25.25) (24.3)
I2 −3.35 −3.03 −2.87 −2.69 −2.75
(37.3) (32.76) (31.4) (28.47) (27.58)
I3 −3.36 −2.99 −2.8 −2.59 −2.63
(33.27) (29.14) (27.3) (24.05) (22.94)
I4 −3.85 −3.48 −3.38 −3.33 −3.47
(32.99) (29.32) (28.7) (26.93) (25.97)
# of obs. 1, 738, 356 1, 591, 887 1, 585, 305 1, 442, 150 1, 314, 028
# of bank. 1, 132 1, 145 1, 164 1, 194 1, 248
Log L −12, 027.51 −11, 859.69 −12, 322.87 −11, 532.09 −10, 302.76
AIC 0.01385 0.01492 0.01556 0.01601 0.01570
Pseudo−R2 0.06586 0.06096 0.05871 0.05791 0.05610
This table takes our best-model variables (Model 1) and reports their predictive power for lags of 6, 12, 24, and
36 months. The dependent variable is failure and the sample period is 1980 to 2003. The estimates for ‘0 months’
is Model 1 model of Table 5.2 for 1980-2003. The estimates for ‘6 months’ is the prediction of the first 6 months
of 2004 by the sample period. 12, 24 and 36 months are the predictions of periods following 2003 as well. The
absolute value of z-statistics is reported in parentheses. A higher log-likelihood, a lower AIC or a higher R2 values
of a model indicate a better fit for the data.
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on the x-axis to the cumulative observations of default event from 0% to 1% on the
y-axis. To obtain the power curve, all firms are first ordered by their respective
scores from riskiest to safest. For a given fraction x of the total number of firms,
the power curve is constructed by calculating the percentage d(x) of the defaulters
whose default rates are equal to or lower than the maximum score of fraction x. This
is done for x ranging from 0% to 100%. The curve is expected to be concave with the
observed defaults concentrated among those firms with the highest predicted default
rate. A model with no predictive power would produce a 45 ◦ straight line from 0%
to 100% default rate; in that case, actual defaults would be evenly distributed over
predicted default frequencies. A model with full predictive power would produce
a straight line up on the y-axis bending 90 ◦ at 100% and stays at 100% to the
end. Panel A in Figure 5.3 graphs one-year, and two-year power curves estimated
in 2003 for our model compared to Shumway’s hazard rate model. Panel B in
the same figure graphs one-year, and two-year power curves estimated in 1998 for
our model compared to Shumway’s hazard rate model. On the horizontal axis the
predicted default rate of the companies is sorted from the riskiest to the safest,
while on the vertical axis the realized defaults of the same companies corresponding
the order on the x-axis is give. So the first graph in Panel A of the Figure 5.3
can be read as following: The riskiest 10% estimated by both models depicted by
Model-1 and Shumway curves cover 70% of the firms that actually defaulted in the
subsequent one-year period. Likewise the other power curve in Panel A shows the
subsequent two-year period. Panel B gives the same curves estimated in 1998. With
respect to power curves, our model is close to Shumway’s model. Shumway’s model
performs slightly better in the one-year curves, while our model performs better
than Shumway in the two-year prediction.
In Figure 5.4, we have presented the estimated default probabilities for Lehman
Brothers and Washington Mutual. Recently in 2008, these two companies have filed
for the two largest bankruptcies of all times.7 Our estimation extends through the
end of 2007, therefore Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual are in the dataset
as healthy companies for our estimation, however the graphs display the upward
movement in the default probability for both until 2007. They are also listed in the
7Please see Table 1.1
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Figure 5.3: Power Curves
Average out-of-sample power curves for one-year, two-year default predictions, af-
ter 2003 and after 1998. In the one year power curve, for each fraction x on the
horizontal axis, the curve shows the fraction of the firms that defaulted within one
year. In two-year curve, the curve shows the fraction of the firms that defaulted
within two years. The fractions on the x-axis are the portfolios. The portfolios
in Model 1 curve formed according to estimated default probabilities at the year
2003 in Panel A by Model 1 in Table 5.2 and the portfolios in HR1 curve formed
according to estimated default probabilities by HR1 of the same table. 10 portfolios
cover the entire company space of 2003 in Panel A and 1998 in Panel B. There are
equal number of firms in each portfolio. Portfolio-1 refers to the riskiest 10% in both
estimations. Riskiest 10% predicts all of upcoming defaults in three years in Model
1. Model 1 is similar to HR1 in one year prediction and more accurate compared to
HR1 in two-year predictions.
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Figure 5.4: Sample Companies
The graphs plot the annualized default probabilities estimated by Model-1. On the
vertical axis, the estimated default probabilities are given in percentages. On the
horizontal axis, the years are given. For Lehman Brothers, the data starts from
1994, while for Washington Mutual it starts from 1986. Both of these companies
exist in the the riskiest first portfolio, constructed in 2003. They filed for the largest
bankruptcies of the US history in 2008, the upcoming year for the dataset.
1st portfolio of Model 1, constructed in 2003, as the riskiest 5% of all companies in
the market.
We have the bankruptcy data up until 2008, however the CRSP database did
not provide the market variables for the last year at the time of our research. In the
dataset from Bankruptcy.com, there are 90 companies 8 that filed for bankruptcy in
2008. 65 of them could be identified among the companies listed in the dataset of
2007. Because of the lack of market information, we have not employed full range of
bankruptcies in Model 1 estimation. In order to utilize 2008 data of bankruptcies,
we have forecasted the annual default rates for two years into the future, 2008 and
2009, using Model 1, and compared the 2008 prediction with the actual default
percentage of the year. Figure 5.5 plots the curves for the Model 1 forecast and
the real data. Model 1 forecasts 1.22% of the companies would default in 2008, the
realized rate is 1.09% 9 . For 2009, it estimates 1.35% of the companies will default,
it means approximately 80 companies10 will file for bankruptcy.
8In the original dataset there were 140 companies that filed for bankruptcy, however 90 of them
can be identified in the CRSP/Compustat merged database.
965 is 1.09% of 5,940 companies. 5,940 is the total number of companies in our dataset for 2007
listed in Table 4.2
101.35% of 5,940 companies. 5,940 is the total number of companies in our dataset for 2007
listed in Table 4.2
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Figure 5.5: Two-year Forecast by Model 1
The graph displays the two-year forecast of the annual default probability by Model
1. The forecasted part of the Model 1 is presented by the dashed portion. The
real default percentages are also displayed. We have the bankruptcy data up until
2008, however it was not employed in the estimation due to the lack of accounting
data. The dashed part in the real data refers to the part that is not utilized in the
estimation.
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5.3 Risk and Return Analysis
Estimated the default rates and analyzed the predictive power of our model, we
shall now focus on the returns offered by various risk groups. Our bankruptcy
model predicts all upcoming failures up to three years; then the next question is,
what would be the investment implications of our predictions? What would be
the return of an investor investing based on our model? In order to analyze the
return structure, we will reconstruct portfolios. Using the dataset for the period
1980-2003, we have estimated Model 1 model and the associated annual default
probability for each company. For the last year in the dataset, 2003, we have sorted
the annualized default probabilities of the companies from highest to the lowest. For
the bankruptcy prediction we had ten portfolios of equal number of companies in
each; now we shall form ten portfolios again, however the number of companies will
not be even, more stress will be given to the tails instead of the center. Portfolios
are still ordered according to their default probability, 1st portfolio containing the
riskiest companies, 10th portfolio containing the safest. The average relative size11,
z-score values and excess returns12 are calculated below for the ten portfolios.
Portfolios of 2003
Portfolio # of Percentage Relative Z-Score Distance to Excess Return
Companies Size Default in 2003
1 320 4.99 % -9.87 1.20 0.36 % -1.98 %
2 320 4.99 % -12.29 1.29 0.26 % -0.69 %
3 641 10.00 % -11.72 1.29 0.28 % 0.66 %
4 641 10.00 % -10.95 1.28 0.32 % 0.53 %
5 1,282 20.01 % -10.88 1.77 0.34 % 1.28 %
6 1,282 20.01 % -10.98 2.48 0.39 % 1.13 %
7 641 10.00 % -11.13 2.93 0.37 % 1.49 %
8 641 10.00 % -11.28 3.80 0.34 % 1.48 %
9 320 4.99 % -11.22 4.74 0.35 % 2.44 %
10 319 4.98 % -10.87 6.16 0.39 % 1.86 %
Total 6,407 100 % -11.12 2.69 0.34 % 0.82 %
11Relative size is defined as the logarithm of each firm’s equity value measured by the market
capitalization divided by the total NYSE/AMEX market equity value.
12Excess return is defined as the difference between the real market return on the firm and the
value-weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX index return.
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The first portfolio, being the highest risk portfolio of all, contains relatively
smaller companies. Altman’s Z-score increases as the risk goes down, displaying
the increasing financial health in the portfolios, however for a couple of portfolios
it presents a confusion, suggesting the fourth portfolio is riskier than the second
and the third. Since our model proved to predict upcoming defaults entirely, this
confusion signals the deficiency of Z-score in bankruptcy prediction. Distance to
default on the other hand is far from being intuitive in any ways. Our new portfolio
specification gets thinner at the tails and fatter at the center. It is now easier to
track the returns on the tails.
The excess returns follows an upward trend with respect to the portfolios since
the estimated default rate is reduced. Figure 5.6 displays average excess returns for
each portfolio in 2003. The excess return makes a jump on the left tail, however on
the right tail, there is a slight difference in excess returns. The first portfolio with
the riskiest 5% of the companies, causing a loss to its holders, makes 1.98% below
the market return on average. The return on the next portfolio improves by roughly
1.3%, yet on average it is still costly compared to the market. From the second to the
third the change is around 1.2%. On the other hand, the gain on the safest portfolios
are close to each other, and the return on the 9th, for instance, provides a higher
return than the 10th. Hence, as an investment tool, our model is more intuitive on
the lower side. It is possible to avoid a loss of around 2% over the market return
by refraining risky portfolios, although the model offers around 0.50% extra profit
moving to the safer companies. Average excess return for the entire portfolio space
being almost equal to zero, .01%, proves it indeed covers the market. Figure 5.6
presents the average excess returns for the same portfolios the next two years, 2004
and 2005. Our first portfolio produces the lowest returns in the the three-year
period, yet the excess returns smoothen both on the left and the right tails. It is
possible to observe a general decline in the overall return on our portfolios, which
cover the entire company space of 2003. The slowing economy would be the reason
for this general reduction in returns, considering almost 1.5% of these companies
went bankrupt before the year ends13. For the investment purposes however, the
smoothening in the returns signals the reduction in the informative power in the
long-run. Our model would be most intuitive for investments up to one year.
13See Table 4.2 for the distribution of bankruptcies within years.
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Figure 5.6: Average Excess Returns in 2003, 2004 and 2005
The graphs plot the average excess return in 2003, 2004 and 2005 for each portfolio
formed in 2003. On the horizontal axis, the first one being the riskiest, portfolios
from one to ten present lower default risk. The portfolios are not equal size. From
the first one to the last one, they contain the 5%, 5%, 10%, 10%, 20%, 20%, 10%,
10%, 5%, and 5% of the companies respectively. Excess return is the real return on




In this dissertation we have explored bankruptcy prediction with a new approach.
Our first contribution has been the mixture model. The mixture model is advanta-
geous in two major ways. We had the opportunity to model the event and timing
of the defaults at the same time, and most importantly we managed to overcome
the eventual default assumption of the standard models.
Second, besides the statistical specification, our model contributed to the lit-
erature by the extensive dataset it covers, all publicly traded companies in the US
from 1980 up until 2007.
Third, we have used critical indicators to predict default events. Productivity
and profitability proved to be central in default probability estimation. Our model
incorporated macro-economic variation through unemployment rate and we have
introduced the government spending as a proxy to the stimulus plans. Govern-
ment spending significantly reduces the default probability suggesting the success
of government support against bankruptcies.
Our fourth contribution is the higher predictive power provided by our model.
A well-specified mixture model performs better in forecasting the default probability
compared to the popular standard hazard rate model both in-sample and out-of-
sample. With the improvements of mixture model, our default prediction delivered,
less than 1% lower than the actual default rate of 8.14% as in-sample, and kept its
predictive power up to three years.
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Our fifth contribution is with respect to the risk and return analysis. Our high-
est default rate portfolio received the lowest return in the market, which supports
claims about the extremely low returns associated with bankruptcy risk.
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